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Abstract
Tax expenditures occur when a government 
provides a reduction in a tax obligation 
such that it collects less tax than it would 
have otherwise collected. Tax expenditures 
are an integral, though controversial, part 
of all contemporary tax systems. This 
policy briefing first summarises the various 
ways in which tax expenditures can be 
defined and measured. Estimates of the 
size of tax expenditures are sensitive 
to these decisions about definition and 
measurement. The brief then focuses on 
energy-related tax expenditures (ERTEs). 
ERTEs are increasingly under attack, 
because they can result in significant 
revenue losses for governments and, 
because, by reducing consumer prices of 
fossil fuel products and thus incentivising 
their use, they contribute to air pollution 
and global warming. Yet, we know little 
about their size, especially in developing 
countries. The little data that exists on 
ERTEs comes from the OECD and a 
few emerging economies; these suggest 
that ERTEs are relatively small in these 
countries. There are very few estimates of 
ERTEs in developing countries. However, 
the available estimates of the size of 
energy subsidies (of which ERTEs are 
one component) suggest that the revenue 
benefits of removing such subsidies in 
developing countries may be much larger.
Introduction
Tax expenditures are an integral, though 
contentious, part of contemporary tax 
systems. While we commonly think 
of subsidies as direct allocations from 
government budgets, tax expenditures (TEs) 
can also be thought of as another type of 
subsidy. The only difference is the delivery 
mechanism. Instead of a direct transfer from 
the government to consumers or producers, 
TEs work indirectly by reducing the tax liability 
owed by consumers and producers to the 
government. They are therefore associated 
with a revenue loss for the government, as 
opposed to a direct expenditure. 
Although TEs reduce revenue, governments 
justify them on economic principles. To 
understand how, it is useful to think of the 
tax system as a tool of public policy whose 
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objective extends beyond raising revenue. 
By altering the tax structure governments 
can change prices and, by doing so, they can 
discourage or encourage certain behaviour. 
For example, by lowering tax on domestic 
production, TEs could encourage the substitution 
of domestically produced oil for imported oil. 
Alternatively, by reducing the VAT rate on basic 
fuels, governments claim to help the poor. 
Similarly, TEs could be used to stimulate the 
development of renewables. However, there are 
questions about the efficacy of TEs to achieve 
these policy goals (e.g. Arze del Granado, 
Coady, & Gillingham, 2012; Metcalf, 2008). 
One of the reasons for the popularity of TEs is that 
they are often politically easier to implement than 
direct transfers that increase the government’s 
budget. By granting tax concessions, governments 
can effectively finance policies outside the 
standard budgetary framework, since they do not 
explicitly require new spending. In some countries, 
this means that TEs do not require formal annual 
approval by the legislature, since they are not part 
of the annual budget, but rather part of the tax law. 
Thus, they are not always subject to the same 
level of scrutiny as regular expenditures (IMF, 
2007). This can hinder transparency. For example, 
while we have some – albeit limited – estimates of 
TEs for OECD countries and emerging markets, 
we have very little information on ERTEs for 
developing countries, notably across sub-Saharan 
Africa. It is important that we improve our 
understanding of TEs in developing countries, both 
to tackle pollution and climate change, as well as 
to close the financing gap to achieve the SDGs. 
In the next section, we discuss alternative 
definitions of tax expenditures. In Section 3, we 
introduce the different ways in which TEs can 
be measured. This is then applied, in Section 
4, to estimate the size of energy-related tax 
expenditures in different OECD countries. Section 
5 presents estimates of the foregone revenue 
from energy subsidies in developing countries 
(although our data do not allow us to see the 
extent to which these are driven by TEs or other 
forms of subsidy). We conclude with some 
suggestions for further research on ERTEs.
What are tax 
expenditures? 
There is no unique and all-encompassing 
definition of tax expenditures (Bratić, 2006). 
Most definitions refer to transfers of public 
resources through a reduction in tax obligations 
in relation to a given tax reference point (Kraan, 
2004). There are, however, many types of tax 
expenditures. Redonda (2016) distinguishes 
between six different classifications of TEs, 
based on: mechanism of delivery, type of tax, 
budget category, policy objective, beneficiary and 
size. Box 1 summarises the ways in which tax 
expenditures are provided in practice.
Box 1 
Ways of providing tax expenditures
A reduction in tax obligations that gives rise to a 
tax expenditure can occur in the following ways:
• Exemptions: Revenue or transactions that 
are excluded from the tax base. 
• Allowances: Amounts that can be deducted 
from the tax base. 
• Credits: Amounts that can be deducted from 
the tax liability. 
• Rate relief: Lower tax rates than those 
generally applied. 
• Deferral: Postponement or delay in the tax 
payment.
Most definitions of TEs explicitly link them 
to the definition of a benchmark tax system. 
Indeed, most of the difficulties in obtaining a 
concrete definition for TEs can be brought back 
to differences in opinion about what should 
constitute the benchmark tax system. Hence, it 
comes as no surprise that different national and 
international bodies adopt different definitions 
(Burton & Sadiq, 2013). This has led some to 
question whether the tax expenditure concept 
is still relevant (Burman, 2003). Nevertheless, 
there are roughly two approaches to defining a 
benchmark tax system: a conceptual and a legal 
approach.
Su
m
m
a
ry
 B
ri
ef
2 www.ictd.ac
What are ‘Tax Expenditures’ and How Big are Energy-related Tax Expenditures?
The conceptual approach defines TEs as 
deviations from a theoretically defined ‘ideal’ 
tax system. In the case of income taxation, the 
Haig-Simons definition of a comprehensive 
income tax is the usual benchmark (Surrey & 
McDaniel, 1985)1. This ensures that taxation is 
based on ability to consume rather than on actual 
consumption, which has the double advantage 
of being able to achieve horizontal equity, i.e. 
similarly placed individuals are taxed in a similar 
manner, and vertical equity, i.e. those who have 
the ability to pay more taxes also contribute more, 
while minimising economic distortions (Alm, 2018). 
With respect to the taxation of goods and services, 
economic theory provides a clear framework for 
what should be done. The taxation of intermediate 
goods (inputs to final goods) should be done in 
a way that does not distort production decisions 
(Diamond & Mirrlees, 1971), except to correct for 
negative externalities (Baumol, 1972), e.g. where 
the production or consumption of a good causes 
harm to others that is not taken into account by the 
producer or consumer. For example, fuel should 
be taxed so that its price is its ‘external cost’, 
which is equal to the market price + the standard 
tax rate + externality cost. If taxation is lower than 
this, then the difference is an implicit subsidy or a 
tax expenditure. 
The legal approach uses a country’s own tax 
laws as the basis to define the benchmark and 
identify differential and preferential treatment. 
Tax base definitions in the tax code are taken as 
the benchmark. A tax expenditure arises when 
there is an explicit exemption (or other form of 
preference – see Box 1) under the legislation. 
For example, the general tax code usually 
defines the VAT base and the applicable rate, 
but often sector-specific tax codes, such as 
a mining tax code, will contain sector-specific 
exceptions to the general VAT code; with the 
legal approach, the difference between the two is 
a tax expenditure. 
The difference between these two approaches is 
their scope and (political) feasibility. Firstly, what 
might not be counted under the legal approach 
because it falls outside of the legal base, will be 
counted in the conceptual approach, as it still is 
part of the economic base. Some therefore argue 
that the conceptual approach is preferable, since 
the legal approach leaves too much room to hide 
tax concessions by toying with legal definitions 
(Villela, Lemgruber, & Jorratt, 2010). However, 
the conceptual approach is not objective either. 
The choice of the conceptual benchmark is itself 
related to ideas about the principles on which 
the tax system should be grounded (Shaviro, 
2003). For instance, the Haig-Simons concept 
of income is based on ability-to-pay. Equity 
is, however, only one possible criterion for 
an ideal tax system, others include economic 
efficiency, revenue adequacy, administrative 
ease, simplicity or environmental sustainability. 
Secondly, the legal approach is often easier to 
implement. While economists tend to favour the 
more comprehensive conceptual approach, it can 
be hard to convert these theoretical ideas into 
workable administrative practices. By referring to 
existing legislation, the legal approach provides 
a more intuitive anchor, making it easier to 
understand, politically more feasible to sell and 
administratively easier to implement.
How are tax expenditures 
measured? 
Quantifying TEs is not straightforward. From 
economic theory, we know that taxation can 
affect economic behaviour, i.e. it can change 
the quantity consumed. A major challenge in 
measuring TEs is accounting for this behavioural 
change. Three methods for calculating TEs can 
be distinguished: the revenue forgone method2; 
the revenue gain method; and the equivalent 
direct expenditure method.3 Each method 
addresses a different measurement concept with 
3www.ictd.ac
1 Under this approach, income is defined as consumption plus the change in net worth.
2 Note that the ‘revenue foregone method’ is the name of a method for calculating the tax expenditure, not to be confused with the 
colloquial use of the phrase ‘revenue foregone’ as the revenue that would otherwise have been collected.
3 All three methods can be applied regardless of which benchmark is used, i.e. the conceptual or legal.
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the main difference being the extent to which 
they take behavioural changes into account. 
1. Revenue forgone method: this assumes 
no behavioural change and estimates the 
aggregate reduction in tax liabilities given 
the current state of the world. The cost of, for 
example, a reduced tax rate for fuel will simply 
be the product of the rate reduction and the 
total consumption of fuel – which is assumed 
to remain unchanged after tax. 
2. Revenue gain method: this incorporates 
behavioural changes to estimate the 
aggregate revenue that would be collected if 
the tax relief were to be removed. That is, the 
tax that would be collected if the tax were to 
be applied, taking into account the reduction 
in consumption that would result from the 
higher price.
3. Equivalent direct expenditure method: this 
assumes no behavioural change but it takes 
into account the fact that the removal of a tax 
expenditure makes the taxpayer worse off. 
This method therefore calculates the gross 
transfer that would leave taxpayers with the 
same after-tax income as they would have 
obtained with the tax expenditure in place. 
This approach takes into consideration that 
transfers increase the taxable income, so a 
slightly larger transfer is required to leave the 
taxpayer equally well off after tax.
Table 1 provides a simplified example for each 
method. In this case, we consider a tax allowance 
on income tax and calculate the tax expenditure 
associated with this tax allowance as the difference 
in the revenue (income tax) collected with the tax 
allowance in place and the revenue collected 
when the allowance is removed, using each of 
the three methods above (see Notes for details). 
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Without tax expenditure
(1)
With tax 
expenditure
(2)
Revenue 
forgone
(3)
Revenue gain
(4)
Equivalent direct 
expenditure
1 Baseline income 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
2 Tax allowance 200 0 0 0
3 Equivalent direct expenditure 0 0 0 50
4 Behavioural change 0 0 -8% 0
5 Taxable income 800 1,000 920 1050
6 Marginal rate 20% 20% 20% 20%
7 Income tax 160 200 184 210
8 After-tax income 840 800 736 840
9 Effective tax rate 16% 20% 20% 20%
10 Tax expenditure 40 24 50
Table 1 Illustration of calculation methods
Notes: Adapted from Villela et al. (2010: p.25). (1) The baseline income is reduced by the allowed deduction, resulting in a taxable income 
of 800. The marginal rate of 20% is applied, resulting in an income tax liability of 160. To answer the question about the size of the TE, we 
first need to estimate the size of the tax liability in the absence of the tax allowance. The difference between the two liabilities will be the tax 
expenditure associated with the allowance; (2) When the tax allowance is removed, taxable income becomes the same as the baseline income 
since we assume no behavioural change. The marginal rate of 20% is applied, resulting in an income tax liability of 200. When comparing the 
tax liabilities in (2) and (1), we see that the government loses out on 40 (200 - 160) in tax revenue with the allowance in place; (3) We assume 
that the removal of the allowance (and the corresponding increase in the effective tax rate) result in a behavioural change. Specifically, we 
assume that increased taxation lowers the labour supply and, hence, the resulting labour income arbitrarily by 8%. Hence taxable income 
reduces to 920. When we then apply the same marginal rate, we obtain an income tax liability of 184. According to this method the presence 
of the tax allowance leads to a tax expenditure of 24; (4) The objective here is to leave the taxpayer equally well off after the removal of the 
allowance. We want his or her after tax income to be the same, i.e. 840. Given a marginal rate of 20%, what is the transfer that needs to be 
provided to raise his or her gross income to a level where his or her net income will be 840? Gross = Net / (1 – rate), thus the necessary gross 
income is 1,050 (=840/0.8). Hence, the transfer needed to bring the baseline income up to this amount is 50.
From Table 1  it is clear that the size of the 
tax expenditure according to the revenue 
forgone method is not equal to the estimate 
when using the revenue gain method, since 
the latter takes into account the change in 
behaviour. The choice of method usually 
depends on the objective of the exercise and 
the availability of data. If the objective is to 
remove the tax expenditure and to replace 
it with an expenditure program, then the 
equivalent direct expenditure method is most 
appropriate. Alternatively, if the objective 
is to get an estimate of the extra revenue 
that can be expected from removing the tax 
expenditure, then the revenue gain method is 
most appropriate. However, accurate estimates 
will crucially depend on the nature and quality 
of the estimated behavioural changes. These 
elasticities, or behavioural changes, are often 
not readily available, especially in developing 
countries. As a consequence, many estimates 
rely on the revenue forgone approach, even in 
OECD countries (Villela et al., 2010). McKitrick 
(2017) warns that this can inflate estimates of 
tax expenditures.  
www.ictd.ac 5
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Figure 1 Tax expenditure on fossil fuels in 2016 (% of GDP)
How big are energy-related 
tax expenditures?
In this section, we focus on energy-related tax 
expenditures or ERTEs, and specifically those 
related to fossil fuels. Phasing out fossil-fuel 
subsidies has gained momentum in the fight 
against pollution and climate change. However, 
while we are somewhat informed about direct 
transfers in support of fossil fuel use, since these 
are usually recorded in government budgets, we 
know less about subsidies through the tax system, 
or tax expenditures. This section builds on work 
done by the OECD (e.g. 2015, 2018) to give a 
sense of how big TEs are, but also to highlight 
some challenges in interpreting these estimates. 
Figure 1 ranks tax expenditures of fossil fuels for 
OECD countries as a percentage of GDP. In 2016, 
OECD countries spent on average about 0.25% 
of their GDP, or 0.74% of average tax revenue, 
on fossil fuel support through the tax system. 
However, there are significant difference between 
countries. Brazil spends close to 0.90% of its GDP 
on tax expenditures for fossil fuels, while Chile’s 
tax expenditure on fossil fuels is almost negligible. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on OECD Environmental Statistics and IMF WEO data.
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However, caution should be exercised when 
interpreting these numbers, especially when 
making cross-country comparisons. Firstly, 
because of interactions between different TEs, 
the sum of the revenue gains from removing 
policies that lower tax obligations on individual 
taxes does not necessarily equal the total 
revenue gain from removing all such policies 
at once (Altshuler & Dietz, 2011). Secondly, 
the previous sections showed that there can 
be significant variation in tax expenditure 
estimates depending on choices regarding 
benchmarks and estimation methods. The 
OECD numbers in Figure 1 build on what 
individual countries publish. However, countries 
differ significantly with respect to the scope and 
depth of their reporting, as well as with respect 
to the benchmark and methodology used to 
measure ERTEs. Higher ERTEs might simply 
reflect a choice for a higher benchmark tax 
rate or greater transparency, rather than more 
support for fossil fuels (OECD, 2015, p. 38). 
For example, Määtä (2012) finds that Norway 
defines ERTEs as deviations from the external 
cost, while Denmark does not. Both countries 
might be providing the same level of support, 
but because Norway’s benchmark is set higher 
than Denmark’s, the latter shows a lower tax 
expenditure on fossil fuels. Cross-country 
comparisons are thus extremely difficult. 
More should therefore be done to harmonise 
these estimates across countries. The OECD 
and the European Commission have already 
started working on this (e.g. Oosterhuis, Razzini, 
Franckx & Ding, 2014). However, while we 
have estimates of TEs for OECD countries and 
some emerging markets, we have much less 
information for developing countries, notably 
across sub-Saharan Africa. 
Energy subsidies and 
tax expenditures in 
developing countries
Because there is little or no systematic data on 
the size of tax expenditures in most developing 
countries (energy-related or otherwise), the 
only, very rough, proxy for tax expenditures 
is data on the size of energy subsidies in 
total. The IMF have collated data on the size 
of energy subsidies for 96 countries. They 
use the ‘price-gap’ method to calculate these 
subsidies; this consists of the gap between 
the international market price of fuel and the 
domestic price4 multiplied by the current quantity 
of consumption5 (Coady et al, 2016). This price 
gap, and the associated subsidies, are financed 
in one of four ways: direct budgetary transfers; 
tax expenditures; concessional lending; and 
the accumulation of liabilities (either within 
state-owned enterprises or by the government). 
Unfortunately, there is no systematic data that 
would enable one to disaggregate between 
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4 For electricity, the cost of supply is used as the benchmark, instead of the international market price. 
5 In effect, this is the revenue foregone method, but applied to prices instead of tax rates.
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Despite having existed 
for a long time, energy-
related tax expenditures 
are increasingly seen as 
problematic. Not only do 
they contribute to pollution 
and climate change by 
subsidising fossil fuels, 
but they also represent a 
significant revenue loss 
for many governments. 
Moreover, tax expenditures 
are typically much less 
transparent than direct 
expenditure programmes.
energy subsidies for some countries are large 
(see Coady et al., 2016; Whitley et al., 2018 for 
estimates of size). Figure 2 shows the size of 
energy subsidies in Sub-Saharan Africa as a 
share of GDP in 2015.
Although we do not know how much of these 
subsidies is due to tax expenditures, the overall 
size of the subsidies is an order of magnitude 
larger than those in OECD countries. The 
median country in sub-Saharan Africa has 
subsidies of over 1% of GDP. This suggests 
that shifting towards cost-reflective pricing, 
including by taxing energy appropriately, could 
generate significant additional revenue in many 
developing countries.6 
Conclusion 
Despite having existed for a long time, energy-
related tax expenditures are increasingly seen 
as problematic. Not only do they contribute to 
pollution and climate change by subsidising 
fossil fuels, but they also represent a significant 
revenue loss for many governments. Moreover, 
tax expenditures are typically much less 
transparent than direct expenditure programmes. 
In this concept note, we set out to briefly 
summarise the debates on the definition and 
measurement of tax expenditures. With respect 
to the definition, conceptual approaches are 
more comprehensive and comparable, but a 
legal approach is often more intuitive and easier 
to implement. With regard to measurement 
methodologies, a key problem is how to account 
for behavioural changes as a consequence of 
taxation. Data on tax expenditures is sparse. 
The little data that exists on ERTEs comes from 
the OECD and a few emerging economies, 
suggesting that ERTEs are relatively small in 
these countries. There are very few estimates 
of ERTEs in developing countries. However, 
estimates of the size of energy subsidies (of 
which ERTEs are one component) suggest that 
the revenue benefits of removing such subsidies 
in developing countries may be much larger.
www.ictd.ac 7
6 See McCulloch and Dom (forthcoming) for a more detailed exploration of the size of energy subsidies relative to different types 
of taxation in Africa.
What are ‘Tax Expenditures’ and How Big are Energy-related Tax Expenditures?
Source: Coady et al, 2016. Note: Pre-tax subsidies are calculated 
using the price-gap method.  Foregone consumption tax revenue 
is the consumption tax revenue that would be collected if fuel and 
electricity were priced at an efficient price taking into account the 
externalities caused by the consumption of these commodities.
Figure 2 Pre-tax subsidies and 
foregone consumption revenue in 
sub-Saharan Africa in 2015 (% of GDP)
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these sources. However, all of them have 
implications for taxation: large budgetary 
transfers to energy subsidies imply worse 
other services for the same level of taxation; 
concessional lending, and the accumulation of 
liabilities both imply a future burden. Moreover, 
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